When Vehicles Become Weapons

In the wake of the recent vehicle incursion at Northland Shopping Centre in Melbourne, it’s time, once again, for a confronting reminder: vehicles remain one of the most accessible and underestimated weapons for hostile intent.

While investigations are ongoing into the motives behind this specific incident, the methodology, using a vehicle to breach a public space, follows a disturbing global pattern. Whether motivated by ideology, mental illness, criminal intent, or opportunistic chaos, vehicles continue to be used to cause harm, create fear, and disrupt the normal operations of public life.

This Is Not New

Globally, we’ve seen devastating vehicle attacks. In fact, in the past six months, 15 vehicle ramming attacks and one ramming plot have been reported worldwide. These resulted in 71 fatalities. Here in Australia, the threat is also real as seen in Bourke Street, Melbourne (2017 & 2018), and now, Northland (2025).

The majority of these incidents have one thing in common: a failure to physically deny vehicle access where it should never have been possible.

HVM Mitigation

Hostile Vehicle Mitigation is not just about installing a few bollards and hoping for the best. True HVM planning requires layered thinking, tailored design, and strategic integration. It includes:

  • Capital works and urban design
  • Security master planning
  • Emergency response protocols
  • Stakeholder coordination (property managers, police, councils, tenants)

It’s not just about terrorism either. Ram raids, mental health incidents, and high-speed police evasions are increasing in frequency. The intent may vary, but the method is consistent, and preventable.

Shopping Centres Are Potential Soft Targets

Many retail precincts like Northland are open, accessible, and heavily populated, ideal conditions for a vehicle-based attack or breach. Yet too often, vehicle access points (loading docks, pedestrian malls, service lanes, open plazas) are left unsecured or poorly mitigated, often due to legacy design, budget constraints, or competing operational priorities.

This is where we must do better. Capital design and security planning must evolve with the threat. It is no longer sufficient to consider vehicle mitigation as a ‘nice-to-have’ or reactive measure after an incident. It must be embedded into the initial capital design of infrastructure, reviewed and enhanced during refurbishments, and maintained as an active risk across the asset lifecycle.

The Path Forward

For asset owners, designers, and security specialist, the responsibility is clear:

  • Conduct HVM risk assessments aligned with best practice.
  • Engage qualified HVM consultants early in design and construction phases.
  • Test and adapt vehicle control measures regularly as part of site-wide emergency preparedness.

Final Thought

No one would advocate for fortress architecture. But we do need proportionate, practical, integrated, and intelligence-led design that balances aesthetics with survivability.

The incident at Northland will fade from headlines in coming days. However, the underlying threat it highlights should not. Vehicles will continue to be used as weapons or forced-entry tools until we consistently design them out of our most vulnerable spaces.